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LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE G-8 HUNTINGTON'S DISEASE
GENETIC MARKER*
The genetic marker is a scientific marker that has never
been considered from a legal perspective. Yet, it is foreseeable
that once the marker is widely utilized, many legal issues will
arise. This Note addresses these issues, and presents some pos-
sible solutions, in order to prepare for the successful implemen-
tation of this innovative -and much needed scientific procedure.
IN 1983, a team of researchers discovered a genetic
marker' which is said to be "linked" to the gene causing Hunt-
ington's disease.2 Although they did not discover the actual dis-
ease-causing gene itself, the finding holds profound implications
for those individuals at risk of inheriting this deadly disorder. Re-
searchers anticipate that once preliminary sample testing using
the marker is completed, a presymptomatic testing program will
be established whereby those individuals at risk for developing the
disease will be allowed to undergo testing for the presence of the
marker.3 Presence of the marker indicates the presence of the
Huntington's disease gene, and, unfortunately, all carriers of the
gene will develop Huntington's disease.4 Thus, the uncertainty of
individuals at risk for developing the disease, with respect to
whether they have actually inherited this deadly gene, will end for
those individuals who choose to undergo the testing. Of course, the
availability and use of the marker in presymptomatic testing
raises significant legal issues not only for those eligible for the
* The author would like to thank Professor Edward Mearns for his help in selecting
this topic. In addition, the author would like to thank her family, as well as Professor
Mearns, for their continual support during the writing of this Note of "first impression."
I. A genetic marker is a stretch of DNA which indicates the presence of another
stretch of DNA, such as a disease-causing gene. See infra notes 15-28 and accompanying
text.
2. Wexler, Conneally, Housman & Gusella, A DNA Polymorphismfor Huntington's
Disease Marks the Future, 42 ARCHIVES OF NEUROLOGY 20, 20 (1985) [hereinafter
Wexler].
3. N. WEXLER, P. CONNEALLY & J. GUSELLA, HUNTINGTON'S DISEASE "DISCOVERY"
FACT SHEET 3 (May 1, 1984) [hereinafter FACT SHEET]; Craufurd & Harris, Ethics of
Predictive Testing for Huntington's Chorea: The Need for More Information, 293 BRIT.
MED. J. 249, 249 (1986) [hereinafter Craufurd].
4. Kolata, Huntington's Disease Gene Located, 222 ScI. 913, 913 (1983).
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testing, but also for society at large.
This Note will first present the scientific theory and technol-
ogy underlying the use of genetic markers.' It will then describe
the condition known as Huntington's disease.6 This section will be
followed by a description of the genetic marker which has recently
been found in connection with Huntington's disease, and a
description of the problems in applying the genetic marker test to
at-risk individuals.7 Finally, this Note will examine the legal im-
plications which this marker raises. Specifically, the Note will dis-
cuss the legal issues of: negligence, infliction of emotional dis-
tress, confidentiality, employment discrimination, insurance
discrimination, and equal access to medical procedures, all within
the context of the Huntington's disease genetic marker.'
I. THE TECHNOLOGY AND THEORY UNDERLYING GENETIC
MARKERS
Before one can comprehend the basis of genetic markers, one
must have some understanding of fundamental *genetic principles.
It is, therefore, best to begin with a simple discussion of our ge-
netic make-up. Almost all cells present in the body contain
twenty-three pairs of chromosomes. 9 One chromosome of each
pair is inherited from one's mother, and the other, from one's fa-
ther.'0 These chromosomes consist of genes, and genes carry the
sequences which determine which proteins our bodies make."
Genes, themselves, consist of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA). 2
DNA is composed of four different bases, and the combinations of
these bases determine our characteristics and our genetic make-
up.' 3 Moreover, each gene is located in a particular position on
each chromosome in every individual, so that a given gene present
on chromosome number one in individual A will also be present on
5. See infra notes 9-28 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 29-53 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 54-85 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 86-218 and accompanying text.
9. FAcT SHEET, supra note 3, at 6.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 7.
13. Id. at 6-7 (The DNA molecule is structured in the form of a double helix resem-
bling a twisted ladder. The rungs of this ladder consist of pairs of the following bases:
adenine, thymine, cytosine, and guanine.).
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chromosome number one in individual B.14 Now that the basic
genetic principles have been presented, we can consider genetic
markers.
Scientists have based their genetic marker research on a basic
property of genes. This property is that genes which are close to-
gether on a chromosome tend to be inherited together.15 Thus, if
one is able to locate a specific sequence or stretch of DNA, and
there is scientific evidence that this stretch is located near another
stretch of DNA, for example, a gene causing a specific disease,
one can assume that a patient who possesses the located DNA
sequence has also inherited the disease-causing gene."6 Thus, the
goal of genetic marker research is to find a stretch of DNA which
signals the presence of the disease-causing gene, or in other words,
is "linked" to that gene.' 7 This linked stretch of DNA is called a
genetic marker because it marks the presence of the disease-caus-
ing gene.' 8
In order to fully appreciate the value of the Huntington's dis-
ease marker, discussed in Section III of this Note,' 9 several funda-
mental principles relating to markers must be understood. Basi-
cally, a stretch of DNA from a healthy individual contains certain
base sequences. These base sequences are recognized by particular
enzymes which have the ability to cut the DNA at these base-
sequence sites.20 These enzymes are referred to as "restriction en-
donucleases."' If a mutation occurs in one of the base sequences,
however, as in the case of an individual possessing a genetic disor-
der, the enzyme will no longer recognize the mutated site and,
therefore, will not cleave the DNA at this site.22 For example, a
stretch without a mutation may be cleaved at two or more sites
14. Id.
15. Id. at 8; Merz, Markers for Disease Genes Open New Era in Diagnostic Screen-
ing, 254 J. A.M.A. 3153, 3154 (1985). Inheritance involves the transfer of genetic determi-
nants from parent to child. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 588 (8th ed. 1981).
16. See FACT SHEET, supra note 3, at 8.
17. See Merz, supra note 15, at 3154; Gusella, Wexler, Conneally, Naylor, Ander-
son, Tanzi, Watkins, Ottina, Wallace, Saleaguchi, Young, Shoulson, Bonilla & Martin, A
Polymorphic DNA Marker Genetically Linked to Huntington's Disease, 306 NATURE 234,
234 (1983) [hereinafter Gusella].
18. FACT SHEET, supra note 3, at 8-9.
19. See infra notes 54-66 and accompanying text.
20. Merz, supra note 15, at 3153.
21. Id.
22. Id. Additionally, a mutation may cause a cleavage at a site which would not
otherwise appear in the DNA of a healthy individual. Lewis, Genetic Marker Testing: Are
We Ready for It?, IssuEs Sci. & TECH., Fall 1987, at 77.
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while one with a mutation may be cleaved at only one site. Thus,
different sized fragments will result.23 These different sized frag-
ments are termed "haplotypes," and the entire stretch of DNA
itself is termed a "restriction fragment-length polymorphism" or
RFLP.24 This RFLP is the genetic marker25 and may contain sev-
eral different haplotypes.2 6 The purpose of genetic marker re-
search is "to find the RFLP haplotype that signals the presence of
the gene responsible for a given defect. 27
As mentioned previously, a genetic marker has recently been
found in connection with Huntington's disease.2 This marker has
profound implications for those individuals at risk of inheriting the
disease. To fully understand the implications of this marker, one
23. Merz, supra note 15, at 3153.
24. Id.
25. Gusella, supra note 17, at 234.
26. Merz, supra note 15, at 3153.
27. Id. at 3154. A haplotype is discovered by use of something called a "probe." A
probe is a piece of DNA which has been obtained by cutting a DNA molecule with a
restriction endonuclease. The fragment obtained is then radiolabeled and added to a sam-
ple of DNA fragments obtained from a patient possessing the disease. This probe will then
hybridize, or stick to, any complementary fragment (RFLP) that has the opposite base
sequence. If this occurs, one has discovered a probe which interacts with the RFLP linked
to the disease-producing gene. In a presymptomatic individual, the adherence would obvi-
ously indicate the presence of the disease-causing gene, since the RFLP acts as a genetic
marker for this gene. Moreover, this one probe would also detect a different'RFLP
haplotype since all haplotypes of a certain RFLP possess some common base sequences.
This is quite important in that two families having a history of a certain disease may have
different haplotypes. The probe would identify the presence of the RFLP, or genetic
marker, and, therefore, the presence of the disease-causing gene in those individuals of
both families possessing a different haplotype. However, for this method to work, a certain
haplotype must be inherited by all of the members of a family who possess the disease-
causing gene. This is true since in order to perform the test with accuracy, not only must
the at-risk individual's DNA be tested, but the DNA of other family members known to
have the disease must also be tested. The specific haplotype must be traced through the
family, and can be, since haplotypes are inherited.
Of course, there are problems with this technique in that it is not accurate one-hun-
dred percent of the time. The possibility of inaccuracy is caused by an event called "recom-
bination" which may cause the genetic marker and the disease-causing gene to become
separated such that each would end up on two different chromosomes. Thus, upon the
performance of the test, the genetic marker present in an individual possessing the disease-
producing gene would not be detected. The test results would, therefore, lead such an indi-
vidual to believe that she had not inherited the deadly gene, when in actuality, she had.
The individual might make various personal decisions other than those she would have
made if the test results had come out the other way. Moreover, the farther the genetic
marker is from the disease-causing gene, the more likely it is that a recombination event
will occur. Thus, scientists try to isolate a RFLP or genetic marker which is extremely
close to the disease-causing gene such that the recombination rate is found to occur less
than two percent of the time. Merz, supra note 15, at 3153-54.
28. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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must first understand the nature of Huntington's disease.
II. HUNTINGTON'S DISEASE 29
A. Clinical Manifestations
Huntington's disease, also referred to as Huntington's chorea,
is a lethal genetic disorder."0 Its symptoms appear in individuals
between the ages of thirty-five and fifty.3x In the United States, at
any given time, five to ten people in 100,000 possess the symptoms
of Huntington's disease.3 2 However, 100,000 more individuals are
potentially at risk of developing the disease. These individuals
have a history of Huntington's disease in their families, yet they
do not presently manifest the symptoms of the disease.3 3 Basically,
the disease is characterized as a "progressive neurodegenerative
disorder."34 In other words, most of its symptoms are the result of
an abnormally early death of the neurons in the brain.35 Neurons
are the cells which allow for the transmission of nervous im-
pulses. 36 They allow the body to receive and carry-out messages
sent by the brain. 7
The symptom of the disease which is most recognized is
termed "chorea."38 Chorea consists of spasmodic, involuntary
movements of the arms, legs, and facial muscles. 9 Psychological
and intellectual symptoms are also present, including: "memory
loss, mood shifts, personality changes, and chronic depression."4
Many patients experience these symptoms years before they mani-
fest any physical symptoms.4' Thus, a patient suffering from de-
29. For a general discussion of Huntington's chorea, see M. HAYDEN, HUNTINGTON'S
CHOREA (1981) and Martin & Gusella, Huntington's Disease, 315 SEMINARS MED. BETH
ISRAEL HosP.. BOSTON 1267 (1986).
30. Rosenfeld, At Risk for Huntington's Disease: Who Should Know What and
When?, HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1984, at 5.
31. Id.
32. Gusella, supra note 17, at 234.
33. Rosenfeld, supra note 30, at 5.
34. Gusella, supra note 17, at 234.
35. Id.
36. H. CURTIS, BIOLOGY 578 (3d ed. 1979).
37. Id.
38. Gusella, Tanzi, Anderson, Hobbs, Gibbons, Raschtchian, Gilliam, Wallace,
Wexler & Conneally, DNA Markers for Nervous System Diseases, 225 SCl. 1320, 1321
(1984) [hereinafter Gusella].
39. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 195 (8th ed. 1981).
40. Gusella, supra note 38, at 1321.
41. Martin, Huntington's Disease: New Aprroaches to an Old Problem, 34 NEUROL-
OGY 1059, 1059 (1984).
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pression as a result of Huntington's disease, is often diagnosed as
having schizophrenia until the physical symptoms of Huntington's
disease appear.42 As the disease takes its course, these physical
symptoms progress to ihe point where the patient has difficulty
standing, speaking, swallowing, and walking.43
The disease lasts approximately fifteen to twenty years until
the patient has degenerated to the point where he is "totally phys-
ically disabled and is unable to communicate."44 The patient will
eventually die from a complication of the disorder such as heart
disease resulting from the abnormal bodily movements, or second-
ary pneumonia resulting from aspiration into the lungs.45 Death
may also result from a subdural hematoma, due to head trauma,46
or from choking.47 The disease takes a slow painful course which
affects individuals physically, psychologically, and intellectually.
B. The Genetics of Huntington's Disease
Huntington's disease is acquired by the inheritance of one
Huntington's disease gene, present on chromosome 4,48 from a
parent affected with the disorder.49 Since the inheritance of only
one disease-gene is sufficient to produce the disorder,50 an individ-
ual carrying the gene will ultimately be a victim of the disease.51
Since an at-risk individual can either inherit the chromosome car-
rying the disease-gene from the affected parent or inherit the nor-
mal chromosome of the pair from this parent, the child of an af-
fected parent has a fifty percent chance of inheriting the disease.52
This percentage is quite significant if you are an individual at risk
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1060.
44. Gusella, supra note 38, at 1321.
45. Id.
46. Folstein, Phillips, Myers, Chase, Abbott, Franz, Waber & Kazazian, Hunting-
ton's Disease: Two Families With Differing Clinical Features Show Linkage to the G-8
Probe, 229 Sci. 776, 776 (1985).
47. Martin, supra note 41, at 1060.
48. Gusella, supra note 17, at 234-35.
49. Rosenfeld, supra note 30, at 5.
50. Id. The development of Huntington's disease appears to be due to the inheritance
of a dominant mendelian gene. Consequently, the child of a parent who has Huntington's
disease, and of a parent who does not, has a 50% chance of inheriting the disease. See
Kolata, supra note 4, at 913. This type of genetic transmission is referred to as autosomal
dominant inheritance. Gusella, supra note 17, at 234.
51. Rosenfeld, supra note 30, at 5.
52. Kolata, supra note 4, at 913. This assumption is based on a situation in which
the affected parent has at least one healthy chromosome of the pair.
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of developing the disease. Moreover, until the advent of the
marker, described in section III, these individuals have had to
wait until middle-age, when the symptoms of the disease appear,
to determine if they would actually develop the disease.53 Conse-
quently, those individuals at risk of developing the disease lead
lives filled with extreme uncertainty and anguish.
III. THE GENETIC MARKER FOR HUNTINGTON'S DISEASE
In 1983, Dr. James Gusella, a researcher at Massachusetts
General Hospital, and several colleagues including Dr. Nancy
Wexler and Dr. P. Michael Conneally, discovered a genetic
marker which is linked to the gene causing Huntington's disease.5 4
Their initial search for a marker began with the study of two ex-
tended families.5  The first study involved an examination of a
forty-member American family having a high incidence of Hunt-
ington's disease.56 The DNA of the family members was exposed
to several probes57 in the hope that one of them would detect a
RFLP linked to Huntington's disease, and on the thirteenth try, a
probe succeeded. 58 The marker it detected, referred to as G-8,
consisted of 17,800 bases. 9 It was also found to fragment into
four different haplotypes (A,B,C, and D) when digested with a
bacterial-restriction enzyme.6 0 These haplotypes exist because
"the marker is not sufficiently close to the gene so that one
haplotype invariably segregates with the presence of' the Hunt-
ington's disease gene.61 Only the A haplotype was found to exist
in the American family members possessing the symptoms of
Huntington's disease. 2
53. Rosenfeld, supra note 30, at 5; Craufurd, supra note 3, at 249.
54. Gusella, supra note 17, at 234-35.
55. Merz, supra note 15, at 3154. Another marker has recently been discovered
which improves the accuracy of the test to 99%. This marker is closer to the location of
the Huntington's gene than is the G-8 marker. Boston Globe, Nov. 13, 1987, at 8, col. 6.
For a discussion of this marker, referred to as D4543, see Gilliam, Bucan, MacDonald,
Zimmer, Haines, Cheng, Pohl, Meyers, Whaley, Allitto, Faryniarz, Wasmuth, Frischauf,
Conneally, Lehrach, and Gusella, A DNA Segment Encoding Two Genes Very Tightly
Linked to Huntington's Disease, 238 Sci. 950 (1987).
56. Merz, supra note 15, at 3154.
57. Id.
58. Id. For a general discussion of probes, see supra note 27.
59. Merz, supra note 15, at 3154.
60. Wexler, supra note 2, at 20.
61. Id.
62. Merz, supra note 15, at 3154.
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The second family studied consisted of more than 3,000 de-
scendants of a woman from a village near Lake Maracaibo, Vene-
zuela, who had Huntington's disease.63 Since many of the family
members still lived in this area, Dr. Wexler was able to collect
blood samples from 570 of the family members and send them
back to the United States, where the DNA in the samples was
tested for the presence of the G-8 marker.64 The marker was also
present in these individuals, although the C haplotype rather than
the A haplotype was present.6 5 Although this latter study seemed
quite conclusive, several problems still exist which make research-
ers, such as Dr. Gusella, hesitant to apply the test to all
presymptomatic individuals who, on the basis of their family his-
tories, are at risk of developing Huntington's disease.66
IV. DIFFICULTIES WITH THE UTILIZATION OF THE G-8
MARKER FOR TESTING PURPOSES
The problems associated with using the marker for widescale
testing are quite varied in nature. To begin with, it cannot confi-
dently be assumed that chromosome 4 always carries the gene for
Huntington's disease.67 It is possible that a Huntington's disease
gene exists on another chromosome in which case the present sys-
tem, using the G-8 marker, would not yield accurate test results. 8
It is felt that in order to resolve this issue, referred to as "hetero-
geneity," approximately twenty large families need to be tested
for the presence of the marker.6 9
Another problem involves the manner in which the test is per-
formed.70 Since the test does not detect the actual disease-causing
gene, blood must be obtained from several individuals of different
generations of the patient's family in order to establish a "marker
pattern. 17 ' All individuals in a family who have Huntington's
63. Id. A pedigree dating back to the 1800's was developed tracing all 3,000 de-
scendants to an individual who had died from Huntington's disease. To date, this is the
largest known number of Huntington's disease patients in one family. Gusella, supra note
17, at 235.
64. Merz, supra note 15, at 3154.
65. Id.
66. Wexler, supra note 2, at 20. See also Gusella, supra note 17, at 238.
67. Wexler, supra note 2, at 20.
68. Id. See also Gusella, Probes in Huntington's Chorea, 320 NATURE 21, 21
(1986).
69. Wexler, supra note 2, at 20.
70. FAcT SHEEr, supra note 3, at 3.
71. Id. at 9.
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should possess the same pattern. 2 Unfortunately, however, the
test will not work with respect to all families or all family
members. 3
There is also the problem of recombination. 4 Approximately
a five percent chance exists that recombination may take place
between the marker and the Huntington's disease gene.7 5 If this
should occur, an individual having the gene may be misdiag-
nosed,76 presumably because the marker would not be detected
during the testing. Obviously, the best test would be one that
could actually detect the Huntington's disease gene itself, rather
than detecting a genetic marker linked to the gene.77
According to Dr. Wexler and her colleagues, "the ability to
test asymptomatic individuals for the presence of a lethal, late-
onset gene is unique in medical history."78 Individuals who have
absolutely no symptoms of the disease will be allowed to escape
the uncertainty of an "unknown" future.79 The fear which they
have sustained their entire lives, because of the knowledge that
they have a fifty percent chance of developing the disease, will be
eliminated by a positive or negative result.80 The question then
becomes, "What about those who obtain a positive result?" The
decision to undergo the test creates a chance of non-carrier status,
but it also creates a chance of a certain death due to Huntington's
disease.8 Perhaps Dr. Wexler and her colleagues stated the effect
of undergoing the test most accurately by acknowledging:
As there is nothing that can be done for the illness, an at-risk
person wishing to be tested for the sake of knowledge and plan-
ning alone gambles for very high stakes: salvation and delivery
from a lifetime of anxiety and ambiguity or a virtual death sen-
tence to be rendered by a quixotic, but inescapable,
72. Id.
73. Id. at 3.
74. For an explanation of "recombination," see supra note 27.
75. Craufurd, supra note 3, at 250. See also Merz, supra note 15, at 3154. Research
is currently being performed to find markers on both sides of the Huntington's gene for the
purpose of localizing the gene. These flanking markers, as well as any other additional
markers, would bring the test beyond its present state in terms of the information yielded.
Wexler, supra note 2, at 20-21.
76. Craufurd, supra note 3, at 250.
77. FAcT SHEEr, supra note 3, at 3. See also Merz, supra note 15, at 3159.
78. Wexler, supra note 2, at 21.
79. Craufurd, supra note 3, at 249.
80. Id. at 250.
81. Wexler, supra note 2, at 22.
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executioner.82
In addition, it is thought that those individuals receiving a
positive test result run a high risk of committing suicide.83 In fact,
it has been stated that in the United States, the "risk of death
• . . due to suicide" in Huntington's victims is a great deal higher
than that of the United States population as a whole.84 This is a
significant factor which must be considered when deciding how
and perhaps whether to apply the presymptomatic test. Further-
more, those individuals who are diagnosed as positive for the gene
will definitely be in need of psychological support.85 First and
foremost, they must be made to understand that they can lead
normal, productive lives for many years to come, and that they
are not alone. Post-testing support groups could be established in
which those individuals who have tested positive for the Hunting-
ton's gene could discuss their emotions and thoughts regarding
their test results. If these individuals are not provided with
mandatory counseling, there is no doubt that the suicide trend dis-
cussed above will continue, in spite of the fact that one is still
dealing with presymptomatic individuals.
Many emotional issues arise as a result of this newfound test-
ing; yet, many legal issues arise as well. Section V of this Note
will respond to several of these legal issues and raise several others
of which society must be made aware.
V. , LEGAL ISSUES WHICH ARISE WITH RESPECT TO THE G-8
MARKER
At the present time, the marker is not available for wide-
spread use; yet, once the testing takes on large-scale proportions,
various legal issues will have to be addressed. Scientists have not
yet concerned themselves with these questions."e They are busy
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Craufurd, supra note 3, at 250.
85. Bird, Presymptomatic Testing for Huntington's Disease, 253 J. A.M.A. 3286,
3287 (1985).
86. The organizations which were contacted in an attempt to gather legal informa-
tion relating to the G-8 marker include: The National Science Foundation; The Hunting-
ton's Disease Society of America (Maryland chapter and the national headquarters in New
York); The National Biomedical Research Foundation; The National Clearing House for
Human Genetic Diseases; The National Institutes of Health; The National Research
Council-Commission on Life Sciences; The Offices of Senators Gore, Simon, and Childs;
and The American Association for the Advancement of Science.
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trying to locate new markers, and if possible, to locate the Hunt-
ington's gene itself. This is quite understandable, as it is not the
responsibility of scientists to answer legal questions. Yet, abso-
lutely no legal material exists on the subject due to the "recent-
ness" of the testing procedure. Therefore, these questions must be
answered now by the legal profession so that when individuals do
look to the law for guidance, they will not be faced with uncer-
tainty and frustration.
This Note will address the legal areas of: negligence, inflic-
tion of emotional distress, confidentiality, employment discrimina-
tion, insurance discrimination, and equal access to medical proce-
dures, as they relate to the marker testing. This list is not
exhaustive of the legal issues which may arise with respect to the
testing procedure; yet, these issues seem to be the ones which are
most readily apparent when one thinks about the problems which
could arise once the test is put into widescale use.
A. Negligence
1. Testing
One of the first questions which must be addressed, with re-
spect to the widescale use of the marker in testing, involves the
problem of who will be liable for errors made at any stage of the
testing procedure. One of the most signficant purposes of the test-
ing is to enable at-risk individuals to determine whether they will
actually develop the disease, so that they may decide in their
childbearing years whether or not to have children. Someone who
is told that she carries the Huntington's gene will be less likely to
have children and risk passing the gene on to them, than will
someone who is told that she most likely does not possess the gene.
A problem arises, however, if a mistake is made in the lab. What
if an individual is given the wrong results and bases his or her
decision to have children on this mistake? Who will be held lia-
ble? Similarly, what if an at-risk couple decides to conceive a
child and then tests the child in-utero for the presence of the
gene? If a lab error is made, who will be liable when it is discov-
ered after birth that the child does in fact possess the Hunting-
ton's gene? What if the parents would have aborted the child had
the initial test been performed correctly?
There are several aspects to each of these questions, but it is
best to begin with the basics. In these situations, one would be
dealing with the tort of negligence. In order to establish this tort,
1988-89]
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one must establish the presence of three elements.87 First, one
must find the presence of a duty.88 Duty is the standard of care
which the physician must use with respect to his patient.8 9 Second,
one must find conduct on the part of the physician which has vio-
lated this duty or standard of care owed to the patient.90 Finally,
a causal connection must be found between the physician's con-
duct and the injury the patient is alleging.9 1 Once the court has
found the presence of these three elements, the tort of negligence
has been established.
Several negligence cases exist involving the birth of un-
wanted, defective children (as opposed to healthy children) due to
testing errors. 2 Although these cases do not involve Huntington's
disease, they do involve a genetic defect which could have been
discovered prenatally if the particular testing procedure had been
performed correctly. The claims brought in these cases are usually
of two types: wrongful birth and wrongful life. The wrongful
birth claim is brought by the parents of the child in order to re-
cover damages which they sustained due to the birth of the
child. 3 The wrongful life claim "is a cause of action on behalf of
a defective child asserting that he would have been better off had
he never been born, thus characterizing the fact of his existence as
'wrongful.' "" These terms are best understood upon an analysis
of applicable case law.
A Virginia case dealing with a wrongful birth claim based on
87. Waltz, The Liability of Physicians and Associated Personnel for Malpractice in
Genetic Screening, in GENETIcs AND THE LAW 141 (1976).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 142.
92. See Gildner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa.
1978)(amniocentesis test was performed on expectant mother in order to determine
whether fetus had Tay-Sachs disease, and parents were given incorrect test results, in reli-
ance upon which they continued with the pregnancy); Curlender v. Bio-Science Laborato-
ries, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980) (child born with Tay-Sachs as a
result of error made with respect to tests performed on parents); Aliquijay v. St. Luke's-
Roosevelt Hosp. Center, 63 N.Y.2d 978, 483 N.E.2d 244, 483 N.Y.S.2d 944 (1984)(child
born with Down's syndrome after parents given incorrect amniocentesis test results); Nac-
cash v. Burger, 223 Va. 406, 290 S.E.2d 825 (1982)(patient's blood vial mishandled and
patient consequently given inaccurate results regarding Tay-Sachs carrier status, resulting
in birth of a Tay-Sachs child).
93. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS 371 (5th ed. 1984).
94. Note, Father and Mother Know Best: Defining the Liability of Physicians for
Inadequate Genetic Counseling, 87 YALE L.J. 1488, 1500 (1978).
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a lab error is Naccash v. Burger.9 5 The plaintiffs in the case, the
Burgers, were of Jewish, Eastern-European descent and were
therefore possible carriers of the Tay-Sachs trait.9 6 Consequently,
when Mrs. Burger was three and a half months pregnant, she and
her husband attempted to undergo blood testing for the presence
of the Tay-Sachs gene.9" The standard testing procedure used to
detect Tay-Sachs depends on the status of the parents. If both
parents are found to be carriers, the fetus is then tested by use of
amniocentesis to see whether the child actually has the disease. 8
A child of two carrier parents has a twenty-five percent chance of
inheriting the disease. 9
The parents in this case were told by a lab technician work-
ing for the physician that Mrs. Burger did not have to be tested
unless Mr. Burger tested positive for the trait. 00 The result of the
test was negative, and the Burgers continued the pregnancy and
gave birth to a baby girl.10' Several months later it was discovered
that the child had Tay-Sachs disease, and she died soon thereaf-
ter. °2 The parents were then retested and shown to be carriers. 03
It was subsequently discovered that Mr. Burger's blood vial had
been mixed up with another patient's vial, thus accounting for the
error. 04 A wrongful birth claim was brought, in which the
Burgers claimed that had they known they were carriers, they
95. 223 Va. 406, 290 S.E.2d 825 (1982).
96. Id. at 410, 290 S.E.2d at 827. Tay-Sachs is a genetic disease of the brain and
spinal cord which is fatal. It involves a deterioration of the central nervous system to the
point where the child experiences blindness, deafness, paralysis, seizures, and mental retar-
dation. Death occurs two to four years after birth. Id. at 409-10, 290 S.E.2d at 827. Tay-
Sachs disease "primarily affects the Eastern European Jewish population and their prog-
eny." Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 815, 816, 165 Cal. Rptr.
477, 480 (1980).
97. Naccash, 223 Va. at 410, 290 S.E.2d at 827.
98. Id. Amniocentesis is a surgical procedure whereby a hollow needle is inserted
into the abdomen and uterus of a pregnant woman. Amniotic fluid is then withdrawn and
tested so that genetic or gender abnormalities of the fetus can be detected. WERSTER'S
NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 38 (8th ed. 1981).
99. Naccash, 223 Va. at 410, 290 S.E.2d at 827. As noted previously, the child of a
parent carrying the Huntington's disease gene has a 50% chance of developing the disease.
See supra note 52 and accompanying text. Moreover, a Tay-Sachs carrier who possesses
one disease-gene does not develop the disease unlike a Huntington's carrier. Naccash, 223
Va. at 410, 290 S.E.2d at 827.
100. Naccash, 223 Va. at 410, 290 S.E.2d at 827.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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would have had the child tested by amniocentesis and would have
aborted her had she tested positive for the disease.1"'
The court held that the Burgers had a cause of action since
there was: 1) a breach of an established duty, 2) a causal connec-
tion between this breach and the resulting injury, and 3) a direct
injury to the plaintiffs. 108 More specifically, the court held in rela-
tion to the above elements that: 1) there was a "duty of reasona-
ble care" owed to the Burgers, with respect to the handling of the
blood sample and with respect to the disclosure of accurate test
result information, which had been violated by the vial mix-up; 2)
because of the incorrect test result, the pregnancy was continued;
and 3) the Burgers were deprived of the opportunity to decide
whether to abort the defective child.10 7 Consequently, the court
determined that the Burgers could "recover damages for expenses
incurred in the care and treatment of their afflicted child.' 0 8
The court also allowed the Burgers to collect damages for
emotional distress. 09 The court stated that "[a]s a general rule,
such damages are not recoverable unless they result directly from
tortiously caused physical injury.""10 It then established that a di-
rect link existed between the false test report, the "deprivation" of
the parents' decision whether to continue with the pregnancy, and
"the emotional distress the parents suffered following the birth of
their fatally defective child.""'
Once the Huntington's marker testing becomes available for
widespread use, the fact pattern of the Burger case could arise
again. For example, what if a couple decides to undergo testing
for the marker before bearing children, and one or both of the
parties are given incorrect lab results due to a procedural error?
Suppose the child then tests positive for the gene? Alternately,
suppose amniocentesis is performed and an incorrect result causes
the couple to continue with the pregnancy? A case like Burger
may provide the answers to these questions. For example, it would
appear, based on the Burger discussion, that a couple giving birth
to a Huntington's child would be able to recover in a wrongful
birth action should they claim they would not have had the child
105. Id. at 411, 290 S.E.2d at 827-28.
106. Id. at 414, 290 S.E.2d at 829-30.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 414, 290 S.E.2d at 830.
109. Id. at 416, 290 S.E.2d at 831.
110. Id. at 415, 290 S.E.2d at 830.
111. Id. at 416, 290 S.E.2d at 831.
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had they been given accurate, positive, test results.
However, a Huntington's infant is in quite a different position
than a Tay-Sachs infant. A Huntington's child will not manifest
the symptoms of the disease until she is a middle-aged adult.112 A
Tay-Sachs child, however, will experience extreme pain and suf-
fering in those first few months or years until death. 13 This is a
distinction the courts could draw upon to disallow claims of
wrongful birth in cases involving Huntington's disease. After all, a
"healthy" child has been born as opposed to an "unhealthy" one.
On the other hand, according to the Burger court, if a duty of
care can be established, as well as a breach of this duty, and a
causal connection between the breach and the injury, then there
should be recovery. Yet, it is doubtful whether the parents will
have a true claim to care and treatment damages since the Hunt-
ington's child will not require any such care or treatment beyond
that of a normal child. In addition, one could theorize that the
parents will suffer no emotional distress until the child, or in this
case, the adult, manifests symptoms. Consequently, emotional dis-
tress damages should also be denied. These issues will be ad-
dressed further in a later section of this Note.
As mentioned above, wrongful life claims are also raised in
the context of lab error cases. For example, in Curlender v. Bio-
Science Laboratories,"4 a couple, like the Burgers, underwent
testing to determine whether they were carriers of the Tay-Sachs
gene." 5 Once again, the parents were given incorrect lab results
and consequently gave birth to a child with severe disabilities
caused by Tay-Sachs disease." 6 The court held that medical labo-
ratories involved in genetic testing owe a duty to parents and their
unborn offspring to "use ordinary care" in carrying out the testing
so that accurate information can be provided concerning possible
defects."7 The court then went on to find a cause of action and
established that damages could be awarded based on the child's
mental and physical condition at birth and during her short pro-
jected lifespan, as opposed to an award based on a normal life-
span.""8 The court also stated that a "wrongful life" claim does
112. Craufurd, supra note 3, at 249.
113. Naccash, 223 Va. at 410, 290 S.E.2d at 827.
114. 106 Cal. App. 3d 815, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980).
115. Id. at 816, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 480.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 828, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
118. Id. at 830, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
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not involve a right not to be born, but is the right of the injured
child "to recover damages for the pain and suffering to be endured
during the limited lifespan available to such a child and any spe-
cial pecuniary loss resulting from the impaired condition."" 9
Once again it is conceivable that a child born with Hunting-
ton's disease could bring a wrongful life suit based on a testing
error. He could allege that but for the error on the part of the
defendant, his birth would never have occurred.' 20 Once again,
however, there is a problem with damages. Unless the suit is
brought when the child has reached adulthood and is experiencing
the symptoms of the disease, what is the source of the child's
damages? Perhaps punitive damages can be awarded, due to the
tort committed by the defendant, as was the case in Curlender.'21
Beyond that, however, an award of damages seems quite
questionable.
2. Failure to Perform Adequate Testing
In addition to the situation where an actual mistake is made
during the testing procedure, another problem arises when the
physician fails to perform a test which should be performed be-
cause of the patient's medical history or for another vital reason.
For example, in Phillips v. United States, 22 the plaintiff, who was
expecting her first child, indicated on several prenatal question-
naires that her sister had been born with Down's syndrome. 123 Her
physician did not inform her of the implications of this history
with respect to her unborn child or of the existence of amni-
ocentesis, a testing procedure which can be used prenatally to de-
termine the presence of Down's syndrome in a fetus. 24 The child
was then born with Down's syndrome.1 25 The mother was then
tested and found to carry a chromosome translocation which is
sometimes a cause of Down's syndrome in offspring. 2 The plain-
119. Id. at 831, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
120. Id. at 817, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 481.
121. Id. at 831-32, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
122. 566 F. Supp. I (D.S.C. 1981).
123. Id. at 2-3. Down's syndrome is a genetically based condition caused by an extra
chromosome associated with chromosome pair 21. It causes mental retardation and the
appearance of other prominent physical abnormalities, such as small rounded ears and re-
tarded growth. Id. at 2 n.2.
124. Id. at 3.
125. Id. at 4.
126. Id.
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tiff was found to have established a cause of action under the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act since the physician had breached the "appli-
cable medical standard of care. 1 27
Several other cases of this nature have come before the
courts. 128 Again, this situation could arise with respect to an ex-
pectant mother having a family history of Huntington's disease.
She could make the physician fully aware of this history and yet
never be informed of the availability of the G-8 marker test for
prenatal use. If the court finds that the doctor should have been
aware of this procedure, the plaintiff would have a cause of action
under Phillips.
A similar cause of action could arise even if a patient not
presently expecting a child went to a physician, due to a concern
she might have of passing the gene on to her offspring. If this
patient was not informed as to the possibility of the test to deter-
mine her carrier/victim status, and thus the probability of passing
the gene on to her child, then damages most likely would be
awarded.
Another issue related to testing performance, or non-perform-
ance, involves the situation where a physician fails to instruct the
patient that her offspring may be born with birth defects. Many
cases addressing this issue have come before the courts.1 29 Most of
them involve a child who has been born with serious defects due to
the mother's contraction of rubella or German measles.
3. Failure to Instruct
In Gleitman v. Cosgrove,15 0 one of the earliest cases involving
127. Id. at 13.
128. See Call v. Kerizian, 135 Cal. App. 3d 189, 185 Cal. Rptr. 103 (1982)(middle-
aged, expectant mother was not given amniocentesis, in violation of her physician's duty to
perform such testing on middle-aged women, thus causing her to give birth to a child with
Down's syndrome); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d
895 (1978)(where amniocentesis was not performed on an expectant woman over 35 years
of age, thereby causing her to give birth to a child with Down's syndrome); Karlsons v.
Guerinot, 57 A.D.2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977)(thirty-seven year old
woman not advised of the availability of amniocentesis, and subsequently gave birth to a
Down's syndrome child).
129. See Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975)(physician failed to prop-
erly diagnose expectant mother's contraction of rubella, and consequently could not advise
her of risks of that virus, thereby causing child to be born with severe physical abnormali-
ties); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983)(parents not
informed of risks of mother's use of prescription drug during pregnancy, resulting in birth
of children with physical and mental abnormalities).
130. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
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a wrongful life claim, the defendant's patient was informed that
she was pregnant, and as a result of this information, she told the
defendant that she had recently had a case of German measles."3'
The defendant told the patient that this illness would have no ef-
fect on the unborn child. 13 2 The child was subsequently born with
extreme physical abnormalities. 13  The child, through his mother,
then brought a wrongful life claim against the defendant which
significantly distressed the court.3 The court stated, in effect,
that the child in bringing the suit was claiming that "but for the
negligence of the defendant[], he would not have been born to
suffer with an impaired body.' 3 5 With respect to compensatory
damages, the court stated that it could not measure "the value of
life with impairments against the nonexistence of life itself."" 6
Thus, since no "damages cognizable at law" arose from the claim,
a wrongful life cause of action was not established. 37
Most importantly, the court stated:
It is basic to the human condition to seek life and hold on
to it however heavily burdened. If Jeffrey [the child] could
have been asked as to whether his life should be snuffed
out before his full term of gestation could run its course,
our felt intuition of human nature tells us he would almost
surely choose life with defects against no life at all ....
A child need not be perfect to have a worthwhile life. 13
Although this statement is quite profound, all courts ruling on the
subject have not taken this position.' 9
The Gleitman position seems to conform to section 920 of the
Restatement of Torts or the "benefit rule" which provides:
Where the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm
to the plaintiff or to his property and in so doing has con-
ferred upon the plaintiff a special benefit to the interest
131. Id. at 24, 227 A.2d at 690.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 25, 227 A.2d at 690.
134. Id. at 28, 227 A.2d at 692.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 29, 227 A.2d at 692.
138. Id. at 30, 227 A.2d at 693.
139. See Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 481-82, 656 P.2d 483,
496-97 (1983)("impossibility of valuing life and nonexistence" does not prevent wrongful
life claim, and although general damages cannot be awarded, special damages can be);
Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980)
(punitive damages awarded based on wrongful life cause of action).
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which was harmed, the value of the benefit conferred is
considered in mitigation of damages, where this is
equitable.14
In fact, the Restatement was directly applied in Troppi v.
Scarf,141 where the court held that the "benefits of the unplanned
child may be weighed against all the elements of claimed
damage."142
Applying the above concepts to the topic at hand, it is quite
conceivable that a pregnant woman who has Huntington's disease
could be told incorrectly that the disease will in no way affect her
unborn child. After the birth of the child, the marker testing could
reveal that the child does, in fact, possess the gene. If one were to
rely on Gleitman, the child would not recover for damages. Yet,
the Gleitman decision appears to be based on the inability of the
court to calculate damages notwithstanding the fact that an actual
tort had been committed by the defendant. Perhaps another court
would take a different approach to this issue. In the other situa-
tions discussed above, recovery was allowed for wrongful life
claims based on the court's emphasis upon the defendant's tortious
conduct.
However, section 920 of the Restatement would definitely
present a problem even in those courts allowing recovery for
wrongful life claims. A Huntington's child will be "healthy" for
several years to come and will provide his or her parents with
great joy and happiness. Such joy and happiness could definitely
outweigh the damage caused by the defendant's tortious conduct;
thus, why should the parents be allowed any form of recovery?
This rationale will definitely be raised in the courts in any type of
suit brought by the parents of a Huntington's child or brought by
the child herself.
In concluding this section, it seems quite apparent that the
courts will look to analogous or related fact situations for solu-
tions, once cases arise involving negligence in Huntington's disease
testing. These cases will arise in several contexts. Wrongful birth
and wrongful life claims will probably be brought if testing proce-
dures are performed incorrectly or are not performed at all. More-
over, such claims will be brought if a physician fails to inform the
140. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1979)(as quoted in Troppi v. Scarf,
31 Mich. App. 240, 254, 187 N.W.2d 511, 517-18 (1971)).
141. 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
142. Id. at 255, 187 N.W.2d at 518.
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patient of the risk of passing the disease onto the next generation.
Although the courts, based on the Gleitman decision, have gone in
both directions, it appears that most will allow some form of re-
covery once a cause of action has been established. Each decision,
however, will have to be made on a case by case basis with the aid
of this related precedent.
B. Infliction of Emotional Distress
Another issue which must be addressed is whether a third
party should be able to recover for the emotional pain he has ex-
perienced due to the harm inflicted on the Huntington's victim.
For example, if a child is born with Huntington's disease due to
negligent conduct on the part of a physician, should the parents be
able to collect damages for the emotional distress they have suf-
fered as a result of the harm done to their child? Moreover, when
a wife has tested negative for Huntington's disease due to a lab
error, should her husband be allowed to collect damages for the
pain he has suffered while his Wife is deteriorating due to the pro-
gression of the disease? These questions will arise once the marker
testing becomes widespread. It is best to answer these questions
now by looking to legal precedent.
In Howard v. Lecher,143 the plaintiffs, parents of a daughter
who had been born with Tay-Sachs disease and had died from the
disease shortly thereafter, alleged that their physician, who knew
of their East-European background, should have known and ad-
vised them of the availability of tests used to detect their carrier
status as well as the status of their unborn child. 4 They alleged
that if they had known that the child had Tay-Sachs disease, they
would have terminated the pregnancy.1 45 The plaintiffs claimed
further that they had suffered mental and emotional distress due
to their daughter's illness and consequent death. 46
The court held that the law in New York at the time re-
quired a plaintiff to establish the existence of a duty owed to him
by the defendant in order to recover for emotional distress. 47
Moreover, the plaintiff had to be "directly injured" as a result of
143. 53 A.D.2d 420, 386 N.Y.S.2d 460 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976), afd, 42 N.Y.2d
109, 366 N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977).
144. Id. at 422, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 461.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 421, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 460.
147. Id. at 423, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 460.
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a violation of this duty. 4" The court also stated that since the
child was the individual who was directly injured by the defend-
ant's conduct, the parents could not recover for emotional distress
due to their indirect harm. 49 The court then stated:
[I]t is virtually impossible to evaluate as compensatory
damages the anguish to the parents of rearing either a
malformed child, or a child born with a fatal disease, as
against the denial to them of the benefits of parenthood.
Damages which are uncertain, contingent or speculative in
their nature, cannot be made the basis of a recovery ...
[A]llowance of recovery would place an unreasonable bur-
den upon physicians and obstetricians. It would either open
the way for fraudulent claims or enter a field that has no
sensible or just stopping point.' 50
This line of reasoning seems quite harsh, and was overruled
less than a year later in Karlsons v. Guerinot.15 1 In this case, the
plaintiffs gave birth to a mongoloid child after the defendants,
knowing of the mother's medical history, failed to inform the par-
ents of the risks of bearing a deformed child or of the availability
of amniocentesis which could have detected the child's condi-
tion.1 52 The parents insisted that if they had known of the child's
affliction, they would have terminated the pregnancy.15 3 The
plaintiffs thus sought emotional and mental damages for the pain
they suffered as a result of their child's condition. 54
The court held that the defendants owed a duty to the child's
mother, and that this duty had been breached, thereby denying
her the choice to terminate the pregnancy. 5 The child was born
and this consequently caused mental distress. 56 With respect to
the Howard v. Lecher decision, the court specifically stated:
We cannot agree with the conclusion . . . in Howard that
the injury from which the parents' alleged emotional harm
stemmed was suffered solely by the child and, therefore,
resulted in only indirect harm to the parents. Rather, the
148. Id.
149. Id. at 422, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 461.
150. Id. at 424-25, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 462-63.
151. 57 A.D.2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977).
152. Id. at 75, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 934. See also supra note 128.
153. Karlsons, 57 A.D.2d at 75, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 934.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 78, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 936.
156. Id.
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pain, suffering and mental anguish suffered by the plain-
tiffs as a result of the birth of a mongoloid child is the type
of direct injury flowing from defendant's alleged breach of
duty to the parents .... 157
Thus, the parents were awarded damages based on the difference
between the value of the emotional damages suffered and the ben-
efits arising from having the child. 158 The court felt that difficulty
in calculating damages should not prevent such an award.119 This
view is quite contrary to that espoused in Howard.
Based on the Karlsons line of reasoning, therefore, it would
appear that parents of a child born with Huntington's disease, due
to a failure on the part of a physician to inform the parents of
available marker testing, would be able to collect damages for
emotional distress.1 60 However, there is an obstacle to recovery in
that the child will not be affected physically or mentally until
adulthood, unlike a child born with Tay-Sachs disease or Down's
syndrome.16 ' Consequently, the parents will not experience pain or
suffering for many years, except with respect to the knowledge
that their child will develop the disease.
A spouse, on the other hand, would probably be allowed to
recover damages if his partner's physician, knowing the family
history of the patient, failed to mention that the genetic marker
testing was available for the partner. However, the disease will
develop, with or without the testing. This is different from the
above case where the pain and suffering is due to a birth that
would not have taken place absent the physician's tortious con-
duct. Yet, if the physician has breached his duty, by failing to
reveal the marker testing procedure, and this procedure is known
by most physicians at the time,1 62 and pain and suffering result
from the spouse's uncertainty regarding the cause of the Hunting-
ton's symptoms once they begin to manifest themselves, perhaps
the spouse could recover for this emotional distress. This argu-
ment, however, is lacking in strength and is quite tenuous.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 79, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 937.
159. Id. at 78-79, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 937.
160. Specifically, all of the elements which allowed for recovery in Karlsons would
have been met. See supra notes 155-59 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 96 and 123.
162. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS 185-87 (5th ed. 1984).
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C. Confidentiality
In addition to raising legal issues concerning negligence and
the infliction of emotional distress, the marker testing also raises
questions concerning confidentiality. For example, once a patient
undergoes testing, who will have access to the test results? Will
spouses, children, or parents of the patient have a right of access
to the patient's test results by law?
To answer these questions it is best to start with the historical
standard in the medical profession, which states that confidential-
ity must be maintained between the physician and the patient.163
Moreover, it is also thought that all genetic counselors, whether or
not they are physicians, must be held to this same standard.1
When this standard is violated, several theories exist by which the
defendant may be held liable. These theories include breach of
contract, defamation, and invasion of privacy. 6 5 In addition, there
are licensing, testing, and confidentiality statutes which protect
the confidential information."66
"[T]he rule of confidentiality forbids unconsented disclosure
of medical information to family members as well as to strangers
"187 It has been suggested, however, that although a patient
does not legally have a duty to inform his relatives of his condi-
tion, the counselor may have a "moral obligation" to reveal the
confidential information."6 8 By doing so, the counselor could pre-
vent the passing of a serious genetic disorder to future offspring.6 9
Furthermore, if the harm to be prevented is serious enough, liabil-
ity could result from non-disclosure. 17
It has been stated that:
A professional's ethical duty of confidentiality to an imme-
diate patient or client can be overridden only if several
conditions are satisfied: (1) reasonable efforts to elicit vol-
untary consent to disclosure have failed; (2) there is a high
probability both that the harm will occur if the informa-
163. Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 618, 674
(1979).
164. Id. at 675.
165. Note, Confidentiality of Genetic Information, 30 UCLA L. REV. 1283, 1297-
301 (1983).
166. Id. at 1302-04.
167. Capron, supra note 163, at 676.
168. Id. at 677.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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tion is withheld and that the disclosed information will ac-
tually be used to avert harm; (3) the harm that identifiable
individuals would suffer would be serious; and (4) appro-
priate precautions are taken to ensure that only the genetic
information needed for diagnosis and/or treatment of the
disease in question is disclosed. 71
Moreover, it has been suggested that disclosure should be made to
relatives when the condition diagnosed is extremely serious but
readily treatable in family members if discovered early enough. 2
This is true, for example, with respect to the diagnosis of multiple
polyposis of the colon which is a precursor to cancer of the
colon. 1
When dealing with an autosomal recessive disorder such as
Tay-Sachs or sickle cell anemia, a positive screening disclosing a
carrier of the gene will more than likely cause other family mem-
bers to undergo screening before bearing children.174 Moreover,
since the siblings of the carrier only have a fifty percent chance of
carrying the gene, their risk factor only becomes "relevant" if
their spouses carry the gene since two defective genes are neces-
sary to produce the disease in the offspring. 17 5
However, this is not the case with Huntington's disease,
where a carrier of the gene will ultimately be a victim of the dis-
ease." 6 If one sibling tests positive, perhaps the results should be
disclosed so that other siblings can undergo testing before bearing
children, as there is a fifty percent chance that each sibling has
the gene and, therefore, the disease.17 7 The carrier or noncarrier
status of the sibling's spouse will not eliminate the chance of the
couple's future offspring inheriting the disease-gene if the sibling
carries the gene. Thus, in "dominant gene disorders," such as
Huntington's, "sex-chromosome linked conditions and chromo-
some translocations," there is a greater "risk" involved if disclos-
ure is not made. 178
A case which discusses the issue of disclosure to a relative is
171. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SCREENING AND COUNSELING FOR GE-
NETIC CONDITIONS 44 (1983) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION].
172. Capron, supra note 163, at 678.
173. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 171, at 43.
174. Capron, supra note 163, at 678.
175. Id.
176. Rosenfeld, supra note 30, at 5.
177. Kolata, supra note 4, at 913.
178. Capron, supra note 163, at 678.
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MacDonald v. Clinger. 17 The plaintiff, MacDonald, was seeing a
psychiatrist, the defendant, and revealed intimate facts to the de-
fendant which were later revealed to the plaintiff's wife without
the plaintiff's consent.180 The court held that "[t]he relationship of
the parties here was one of trust and confidence out of which
sprang a duty not to disclose. Defendant's breach was not merely
a broken contractual promise but a violation of a fiduciary respon-
sibilty to the plaintiff implicit in and essential to the doctor-pa-
tient relationship."""1 In addition, however, the court stated that
disclosure is permissible where "there is a danger to the patient,
the spouse or another person." 18 2 Thus, this case leads one to be-
lieve that a physician would be liable for disclosing the results of a
genetic marker test to the spouse of the at-risk individual except
in an instance where the patient is likely to commit suicide.
In addition to the exceptions noted above, there are other in-
stances when close relatives should be informed of the patient's
test results. For example, every child has a right to know if his
parent has tested positive for the marker. There are several rea-
sons for this line of thinking. First and foremost, if the parent has
tested positive then the child has a fifty percent chance of develop-
ing the disease.183 In all likelihood, the child will want to be tested
before making his own childbearing decisions. In addition, if a
child knows of his or her parent's impending disease, then ar-
rangements can be made to provide for the parent when he can no
longer provide for himself. Financial resources can be set aside for
the future. Any disease takes a devastating toll on a family, finan-
cially as well as emotionally; however, part of the burden can be
circumvented if plans are formulated well in advance of the
problems to come.
A spouse should also be informed as to his partner's test re-
sults for the financial and childbearing reasons stated above. If a
spouse tests positive, the other spouse must decide whether he or
she wants to subject a child to a fifty percent chance of inheriting
the disease-causing gene. The decision whether to bear a child
must be made by both parties, and any relevant information in-
volved in this decision should not be held in secrecy by either the
179. 84 A.D.2d 482, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
180. Id. at 482, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 802.
181. Id. at 487, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 805.
182. Id. at 488, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 805.
183. Kolata, supra note 4, at 913.
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genetic counselor or the disease victim. A disclosure by one of the
two parties must take place.
With respect to the sibling disclosure issue, it is this author's
opinion that a disclosure of test results should not be made
mandatory. If an individual is truly concerned about whether or
not she is carrying the gene, based on a family history of the dis-
ease, then the individual should be allowed to undergo the testing.
This individual should not be allowed access to test results from
other family members. The familial line must be drawn some-
where, and it should be drawn right outside of the parent-child
and spousal relationships.
Confidentiality is certainly one of the most pressing issues in-
volved in the marker testing, and at present, only those individuals
who are undergoing the sample testing are given their results.""
Once testing becomes widespread, however, individuals will want
to be informed of their relatives' test results. Solutions, therefore,
must be found now, and the above factors must be taken into con-
sideration. In addition, these questions must be answered with re-
spect to disclosing test results to employers.
D. Employment Discrimination
Should an employer, present or potential, have access to the
results of the G-8 marker testing? If so, can he use the results to
discriminate against a Huntington's victim? It has been stated
that disclosure of genetic testing results should only be allowed if
the patient has given express consent to such disclosure.1 15 It has
also been suggested that no justification exists for the disclosure of
genetic screening test results to an employer. 8" Yet, in 1981, six
large Fortune 500 corporations in the United States were testing
their employees for the presence of genes which made them spe-
cifically vulnerable to certain chemicals, thereby seemingly indi-
184. Conversation with Christopher Chambers, Assistant to the Director of Patient
Services of the national headquarters of the Huntington's Disease Society of America lo-
cated in New York, New York (Sept. 1987); Conversation with Philip Cohen of the na-
tional headquarters of the Huntington's Disease Society of America located in New York,
New York (Oct. 1988) [hereinafter Chambers & Cohen].
185. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 171, at 42.
186. Waltz & Thigpen, Genetic Screening and Counseling: The Legal and Ethical
Issues, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 696, 748 (1973) [hereinafter Waltz]. See generally Canter, Em-
ployment Discrimination Implications of Genetic Screening in the Workplace Under Title
VII and the Rehabilitation Act, 10 AM. J.L. MED. 323 (1985); Note, Genetic Testing in
Employment: Employee Threat?, 15 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 1187 (1981).
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cating that positive test results would be used to dismiss present
employees and as an excuse not to hire future employees."' In
1982, almost five dozen other Fortune 500 companies said they
would implement the same testing within five years.188 Other in-
stances of this type of discrimination also exist. For example, in
the early 1970's, black employees working for the airlines were
given ground positions only, out of fear that if these individuals
worked in planes, and the planes suddenly depressurized, a
"sickling crisis might occur."189 In addition, prior to 1981, the Air
Force would not allow cadets, who were carriers of sickle-cell ane-
mia, into the academy.1 90
In terms of mass screening programs, in 1972, the Sickle Cell
Anemia Control Act was passed which allowed the federal govern-
ment to make grants to those public and private organizations
wishing to establish testing and counseling programs." 1 In fact, in
1977, sixteen states set up screening centers. 92 These screening
programs were mandatory in eight states.1 93 In addition, in 1985,
forty-three states had legislation relating to phenylketonuria
(PKU) testing. 9 California also is undertaking a mass screening
program for alpha fetoprotein.1 95 Although all of these programs
are used to screen children, who is to say that the test results will
not later be disclosed to employers of these children?
A case involving an actual disclosure of medical information
to an employer is Home v. Patton.198  The plaintiff, Horne,
claimed that he informed his physician, the defendant Patton, to
187. Note, supra note 165, at 1308 n.175.
188. Smith, Genetics, Eugenics, and Public Policy, 1985 S. ILL U. L.J. 434, 443
n.54.
189. Note, supra note 165, at 1292 n.60. Sickle-cell anemia is a condition caused by
the inheritance of two recessive genes in which low oxygen concentrations in the blood
cause the hemoglobin to take on the shape of an S. Consequently, the red blood cells do not
flow through the capillaries properly, and a "sickling crisis" occurs. The effects of the dis-
ease include pain, early death, anemia, as well as other debilitating manifestations. Id. at
1287 n.29.
190. Smith, supra note 188, at 443 n.54.
191. Waltz, supra note 186, at 703.
192. Note, supra note 165, at 1293 n.61.
193. Id.
194. Smith, supra note 188, at 442 n.47. PKU is a condition which produces sub-
stantial mental retardation in children and is caused by the presence of a single defective
gene. Id.
195. Steinbrook, In California, Voluntary Mass Prenatal Screening, HASTINGS CTR.
REP., Oct. 1986, at 5.
196. 291 Ala. 701, 287 So. 2d 824 (1973).
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keep all information acquired during the course of the physician-
patient relationship confidential. He further alleged that the de-
fendant ignored the instruction and gave the plaintiff's employer
some medical information relating to the plaintiff which subse-
quently caused the plaintiff to be dismissed. 197 The court held:
[A] medical doctor is under a general duty not to make
extra-judicial disclosures of information acquired in the
course of the doctor-patient relationship and that a breach
of that duty will give rise to a cause of action. Unautho-
rized disclosure of intimate details of a patient's health
may amount to unwarranted publication of one's private
affairs with which the public has no legitimate concern
such as to cause outrage, mental suffering, shame or hu-
miliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities. Nor can it be
said that an employer is necessarily a person who has a
legitimate interest in knowing each and every detail of an
employee's health. 8
The plaintiff received a favorable verdict.1 99
It would appear that, based on the Home case, a physician or
genetic counselor who has established a physician-patient relation-
ship with a patient who was tested for the presence of the Hunt-
ington's gene would be liable for disclosing the results of the test
to an employer. This case also establishes that an employer is not
entitled to such information. 00
In addition to the privacy interest described above, there are
other reasons why an employer should not have access to test re-
sults. For example, it has been suggested that an employer will
probably terminate an employee known to have Huntington's
rather than accomodate his increasing medical needs.2°0 This is
legal according to modern case law, at least where private employ-
ers are involved.20 2
197. Id. at 704-05, 287 So. 2d at 825-26.
198. Id. at 709-10, 287 So. 2d at 830-31.
199. Id. at 711, 287 So. 2d at 832.
200. Id. at 709-10, 287 So. 2d at 830-31.
201. Note, supra note 165, at 1308.
202. See Munhollon v. Pennsylvania R.R., 180 F. Supp. 669, 673 (N.D. Ohio
1960)(court stated that it is "well established in law . . . that an employer, apart from
contract or statute cannot be compelled to refrain from discharging any or all employees");
Fisher v. Church of St. Mary, 497 P.2d 882 (Wyo. 1972)(ten-month teaching contract
terminated by school after plaintiff, a teacher, suffered a cerebral hemorrhage but recov-
ered before the expiration date of the contract). Cf. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone,
465 U.S. 624, 626 (1984)(court discusses § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 found at
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An employer also has no guarantees regarding an employee's
future health status. Any employee may develop cancer or
Alzheimer's disease in the future. Why should a disease whose
appearance will manifest itself with "certainty" be treated any
differently? It is, of course, important that an individual who has
tested positive for the disease should not be permitted to take ad-
vantage of his employer's lack of knowledge. Once symptoms be-
gin to appear which affect the individual's performance at work,
that individual should resign, if necessary, to preserve the safety
of his fellow workers as well as his own safety, particularly if he is
involved in mechanical labor. However, this individual must not
be denied an employment opportunity thirty years before the
manifestation of symptoms occurs. All of these reasons support
the view that an employer should not have access to the G-8
marker test results.
E. Insurance Discrimination
The same problems which have been referred to above, with
respect to employment discrimination, also arise in the context of
insurance discrimination. If an insurer is told that the potential
insured has tested positive for the presence of the marker, one of
two things could happen. The insurer could either charge the in-
sured extremely high premiums or refuse coverage to the appli-
cant.203 This is a dangerous situation in that those who have tested
positive will need to utilize health care services to a more substan-
tial degree than those who have not inherited the disease.
Although it has been stated that there is absolutely no valid
reason for an insurance company to receive genetic testing results
without the consent of the applicant, due to possible discrimina-
tion,204 instances of such discrimination based on disclosure do ex-
ist. For example, in the 1970's, carriers of sickle-cell anemia were
charged higher premiums than other insured parties in spite of the
fact that the insurance companies did not base the increased pre-
29 U.S.C. § 504 which states that "[n]o otherwise qualified individual ... shall, solely by
reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal Financial
Assistance"); Kelley v. Bechtel Power Corp., 633 F. Supp. 927 (S.D. Fla. 1986)(plaintiff
unlawfully terminated under the Florida Human Relations Act of 1977 due to the handi-
cap of epilepsy).
203. Note, supra note 165, at 1308.
204. Id. at 1310.
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miums on mortality tables.10 5 Insurers of Huntington's patients
probably will not behave any differently.
However, as asked previously, how does insuring an individ-
ual who will definitely acquire Huntington's disease, based on the
results of the G-8 testing procedure, differ from insuring someone
who has a family history of a particular disorder but for which
there is no diagnostic test? This latter individual may develop can-
cer, Alzheimer's disease, Parkinson's disease, or any other condi-
tion thirty years from the time of the initiation of the coverage
based on a known or unknown genetic predisposition. An insurer
takes a risk any time he insures an individual. Why should he be
allowed to discriminate against a person who has tested positive
for the marker simply because medical technology has allowed for
the discovery of information which cannot be discovered with re-
spect to other potentially lethal conditions? Access could cause
discrimination, and thus should not be allowed.
F. Equal Access to the Testing Procedure
Another issue raised by the marker testing involves the avail-
ability of access to the procedure. At the present time, only five
testing centers are available for use, and they are found in the
following states: Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, Michigan,
and Minnesota. 06 Moreover, one must actually live within a 150
mile radius of one of the centers in order to be tested (with the
exception of the Minnesota center) due to the fact that one must
obtain genetic counseling during and after the performance of this
two to four month procedure. 07 Yet, serious concerns arise with
respect to other individiuals who do not reside in these states and
who cannot afford to uproot themselves in order to receive the
testing. Are they being discriminated against due to their eco-
nomic status?
The same type of discrimination exists with respect to the
program established in California to detect the presence of alpha
fetoprotein prenatally. 208 The program requires obstetricians and
those individuals involved in prenatal health care to administer the
test to all expectant mothers who are searching for prenatal care
205. Id. at 1292 n.60.
206. Chambers & Cohen, supra note 184.
207. Id.
208. See Steinbrook, supra note 195.
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before their twentieth week of pregnancy. 09 The "success or fail-
ure" of the program is going to determine whether the testing will
be established nationally. 10
What about the women in other states who have physicians
who are not required to offer the test? Are they not being discrim-
inated against as far as testing is concerned? Why should they not
receive information regarding the test which their California
counterparts are receiving, especially when a fetus' health is at
stake?
A case which is somewhat related to the issue at hand is
NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc."l l The defendant in
the case, Wilmington Medical Center, wanted to move the "major
tertiary care components" of its inner city hospital to a nearby
suburb.2"2 The plaintiffs, several organizations and individuals
representing the interests of minority and handicapped individu-
als, contended that such a move would constitute discrimination
under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and under Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The plaintiffs argued that
a disproportionate impact would be felt by minorities as well as
elderly and handicapped individuals of the inner city, with respect
to the quality as well as the amount of health care available.213
The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare found that
these statutes had, in fact, been violated. As a remedy, the Secre-
tary established a contract of assurances which called for the de-
fendant to remove the disproportionate impact of the relocation,
and thereby conform to the statutes.21 4 The court held that the
Secretary's decision to adopt the contract of assurances was rea-
sonable, and thus the contract would create compliance with the
statutes in question.215 Consequently, the court found for the de-
fendant on this latter issue.1
Based on this case, therefore, it would appear that if those
individuals who are not capable of gaining access to the marker
testing centers could prove discrimination on a statutory basis,
then some form of remedy would be appropriate. Compliance with
209. Id. at 5.
210. Id.
211. 453 F. Supp. 280 (D. Del. 1978).
212. Id. at 285.
213. Id. at 284.
214. Id. at 330.
215. Id.
216. Id.
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the statute would have to be achieved. It is important to note,
however, that at the present time only two centers have been es-
tablished, so that the accuracy of the testing procedure can be
verified, and individuals can be monitored in proper facilities.21"
Researchers must make sure that the test is truly accurate and
that all variables can be controlled before they allow widescale
administration of the test. A larger number of testing centers will
become available in the near future," 8 provided the sample testing
goes well. Should this occur, however, equal access must be as-
sured to all at-risk individuals. Monetary factors and state of resi-
dency must not play a role in such access. If individuals cannot
afford to move to a testing center location, then government funds
must be provided. Discrimination with regard to the testing must
not occur at any level. If the government does not become in-
volved, the test will basically be available only to those who are
well off financially. Such a situation would be intolerable.
CONCLUSION
The G-8 marker test is truly a medical miracle. Now individ-
uals who are at risk of inheriting Huntington's disease can deter-
mine, with a fairly high rate of accuracy, whether they actually
carry the Huntington's gene and will thus become victims of the
disease. This procedure, however, raises serious legal questions.
Negligence cases involving testing errors, testing non-perform-
ance, and physician failure to instruct as to the possibility of in-
heritance by offspring, will definitely arise in the future. In addi-
tion, the test raises questions concerning infliction of emotional
distress, confidentiality, employment and insurance discrimination,
as well as equal access to testing centers. Although the courts will
handle these cases on an individual basis, there appears to be a
high rate of recovery for plaintiffs, with respect to all of these
areas, in related factual situations. It must be remembered, how-
ever, that the courts have not dealt directly with Huntington's
cases which have arisen as a result of the testing procedure. This
is due to the fact that the test only recently became available
purely for sample testing purposes. Moreover, at the present time,
legal information has not been written on this subject to guide the
courts. Hopefully, this Note will serve as a guide to courts, attor-
217. Chambers & Cohen, supra note 184.
218. FAcT SHEET, supra note 3, at 5.
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neys, or to anyone who is seeking information on the legal impli-
cations of the G-8 marker test.
CHERYL L. BECKER

